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INTRODUCTION
Birgit Matthiesen
MS. MATTHIESEN: My name is Birgit Matthiesen. I work at the
Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C. I am in the Economic and Trade
Policy section of that embassy.
This panel is going to be the border guys. These are going to be
spokespersons and representatives from the Canadian Border Service
Agency, the Customs and Border Protection, and the RCMP, and they are
here to talk to you about not only their programs but the alphabet soup of
CSI, FAST, C-TPAT, AMS, AMI,' et cetera, et cetera.
We are going to start with Warren Coons. He is with the RCMP - and I
did not realize you are a Superintendent - and he is the Director of the
Integrated Border Enforcement Team which Ambassador Wilson made
reference to.
We will move to his left, Mr. Todd Owens. He is the Executive Director
at U.S. Customs and Border Protection for cargo and conveyance security.

1 See generally Canada Border Services Agency, http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca (last visited
Oct. 10, 2008); U.S. Customs and Border Protection, http://www.cbp.gov (last visited Oct. 10,
2008); Royal Canadian Mounted Police, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca (last visited Oct. 10,

2008).
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And we will end up with Joy Aldous, Director of Commercial Policy,
Admissibility Branch of the Canada Border Services Agency. And, hopefully
after her presentation we will have some dynamic Q and A.
And so I would like to hand the mike over to Warren.

CANADIAN SPEAKER
Warren Coons*
MR. COONS: Thank you very much, Birgit. First of all, it is a pleasure to
be here today to speak about something that is certainly very important to the
RCMP and I believe very important to all law enforcement agencies that
have a nexus to the border in both of our countries.
There was a question asked at Ambassador Wilson's luncheon this
afternoon about how we secure the border between Minnesota and
Washington,2 and hopefully during this presentation, you will get a better
idea of how exactly we intend to do that.
As everybody here is aware, we have a very long and unique border. 3 It is
characterized by remote, sparsely populated areas in some parts of the
countries, our two countries, and as well, urban centers in other parts of the
country.4 This geography and the demographics of the borders pose certain
challenges to law enforcement and also opportunities for criminality.5

Warren Coons is the director of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs), where
the shared outcome will be enhanced border security coverage and improved international
relationships along the shared border, as a result of focusing on improving information-sharing
between Canadian and US law enforcement agencies and conducting intelligence-led investigations. Border-related investigations, based on intelligence from all IBET partners, will be
more effective, rather than random enforcement activity. Law enforcement interoperability
will improve with the development of a technically successful communications system linking
multi-agencies that will facilitate joint operations, while addressing health and safety concerns
for law enforcement officers along the 49th parallel.
2 See generally UNITED STATES-CANADA BORDER DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT vii
(2001) available at www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/pdfs/cid/CanadaUSDrugThreat.pdf (last visited Oct
12, 2008) (discussing how the United States and Canada are dealing with criminal issues at the
border).
3 See generally UNITED STATES-CANADA BORDER DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT ix
(2007) available at http://www.hsdl.org/hslog/?q=node/4233 (follow "Border Drug Threat
Assessment 2007" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 12, 2008) (providing a general overview of the
geography of the Canada United States border).
4 Seeld.
5 See generallyId.
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Since 9/11 in particular, there has been a change in the attitude towards
the perception of the border, in some quarters the border is perceived as a
threat. 6 The level of that threat is certainly debatable; 7 however, there are a
couple of givens that we definitely accept. And they are first of all, that it is8
virtually impossible to eliminate 100 percent of threats along the border.
And the second is that organized crime has and will continue to exploit any
vulnerabilities or gaps along that border. 9 So for these reasons, it is
imperative that law enforcement remain ever-vigilant and innovative and
most importantly, intelligence-led, 10 something I will touch upon a little bit
later as we confront the challenges at the border.
So, just to give you a brief history of the Integrated Border Enforcement
Teams: in December of 2001, our two governments signed the Smart Border
Declaration." The four pillars of that Smart Border Declaration are the
secure flow of goods, people, and secure infrastructure, and as well, the
coordination of intelligence
sharing and information sharing in the pursuit of
12
those initiatives.
The Smart Border Declaration also had a 30-point action plan included in
it. 13 One of those points was the establishment of Integrated Border
Enforcement Teams across our two countries. 14 Initially IBETs were a local
initiative in Washington State and British Columbia, and highly successful in
that area. 15 As a result of 9/11, as they looked around for opportunities to
improve border security, it was determined
that IBET would be an
16
appropriate response for our two countries.
6 See generally John Noble, FortressAmerica or FortressNorth America? 11 L. & Bus.
REV. AM. 461 (2005) (arguing that the United States and Canada should continue to cooperate
in the areas of police, intelligence and immigration sectors post 9/11).
7 See generally id.
8 See generally id.
9 See INTEGRATED BORDER ENFORCEMENT TEAMS (IBETs) CANADA-UNITED STATES
IBET
THREAT
ASSESSMENT
(2007),
available
at
http://www.rcmpgrc.gc.ca/security/ibets threatassesse.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2008) (assessing the role of
the IBET program in national security issues at the Canada-United States border).
1o See generally id.
11 See U.S.-CANADA SMART BORDER: 30 POINT ACTION PLAN UPDATE (December 6,
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021206-1.html (providing an overview of the Smart Border Declaration and Associated 30-Point Action Plan).
12 See id
13 See id.
14 See id.
15 See Noble, supra note 6 (discussing Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, their creation, and use).
16 See Hon. Lawrence Macaulay, Solicitor General of Canada, Address at Launching of the
Central St. Lawrence Valley Integrated Border Enforcement Team: Talking Points (Feb. 28,
2002) available at http://www.ps-sp.ca/publications/speeches/20020228_e.asp (last visited
Oct. 12, 2008) (speaking about the actions by the United States and Canada in response to the
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The five core agencies in the IBETs as it stands today are the Canada
Border Services Agency, RCMP, U.S. Customs Border Protection Office of
Border Patrol, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE, and U.S.
Coast Guard.17

There are 15 IBET regions and 24 IBET units across Canada. i8 I say
Canada because in Canada we have dedicated - the RCMP and CBSA have
dedicated - resources to the
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams while in the United States 19 they
work under the IBET philosophy, that we can call upon our U.S partners in
those core agencies and work closely and collaboratively with them on a
regular basis; 20 however, they do not have dedicated resources attached to the
IBET program. 21 There are a lot of good reasons to expect that that could
change in the near future, but I certainly do not want to let anything out of
the bag here especially considering some of the people in the room here
today. But we would hope that the IBET program is something that is
embraced, and that dedicated resources will be put into this initiative on both
sides of the border in the near future.
I should also, as we move forward, clear up any misunderstandings there
may be about how we might operate. Even though we talk about integrated
teams, from a law enforcement perspective, there is no gun-toting police
22
officers from Canada working in the United States or vice-versa. When we
attacks on 9/11 and the effectiveness of those actions including the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams).
17

See Nunez-Neto, Bias,

THE U.S. BORDER PATROL at

CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, BORDER SECURITY: THE ROLE OF
19, available at

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32562.pdf.
8 See INTEGRATED BORDER ENFORCEMENT TEAMS (IBETS) CANADA-UNITED STATES
IBET THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 9 (assessing the role of the IBET program in national
security issues at the Canada-United States border).
19 See generally Building Cross-Border Links: A Compendium of Canada-US Government
(last
Collaboration, http://www.csps-efpc.gc.ca/research/publications/html/p128/28.e.html
visited Oct. 7, 2008) (providing information regarding RCMP and CBSA involvement in
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams); Royal Canadian Mounted Police: Horizontal Initiatives, http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/2006-2007/inst/rcm/rcm10-eng.asp (last visited Oct. 7,
2008) (providing information regarding money invested by the CBSA and RCMP in the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams).
20 See generally LEBEUF, MARCEL-EUGENE, CANADA-US LAW ENFORCEMENT BORDER
PARTNERSHIP-

AN

EVOLVING

SITUATION

(2002)

available

at

http://dsp-

psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/JS62-118-2003E.pdf (last visited Oct 12, 2008) (discussing collaboration between Canada and United States at the Integrated Border Enforcement Team level).
21 See generally id.
22 See Moll, Frederic J., The Legal & TechnologicalAdvantage of a North American Perimeter in the War Against Terrorism:How the Implementation of a Schengen-Type System will
Best Serve the Security Interests of the United States and Canada,2004 SYRACUSE SCIENCE
& TECHNOLOGY LAW REPORTER 2, at 7 (Spring 2004) (discussing whether United States
agents should be permitted to carry guns in Canadian airports and joint border facilities).
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are talking about actual enforcement work, there are still barriers in places
that prevent us from crossing the border with our firearms.23 That does not
happen, but we work were closely together exchanging intelligence and
information on a regular basis.24
However, from the intelligence side, there is integration where we are
working in each other's countries. 25 There are five co-locations Integrated
Border Intelligence Teams (IBIT) across both of our countries, three in the
United States, two in Canada.26 And these have representatives from all the
agencies who are working together, exchanging intelligence,
and working
27
through problems in the same office in each of our countries.
So the IBET model: I touched upon the intelligence-led policing, which
we believe is so important. IBETs are intelligence-led enforcement teams
comprised of federal, state, provincial, and local law enforcement personnel
working together to enhance our border security.28
So what exactly is intelligence-led? Essentially what it means is that our
border is so long and diverse that it is impossible and ineffective to string law
enforcement officers on each side, every mile along our border. 29 It simply
will not work.
We must collaborate and, yes, integrate our operations to the greatest
extent possible and rely on the intelligence to direct our operations to where
we believe we will have the greatest opportunity for success. 30
And we must also ensure that there is a seamless and fluid exchange of
information between our border investigative units and our inland
investigative units because organized crime does not reside at the border.3'
Organized crime is in Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Los Angeles,
Philadelphia, New York, other places as well.32 The primary places are the
large centers where it resides.33

23
24

See id.
See generally Building Cross-Border Links: A Compendium of Canada-US Government

Collaboration, supra note 19.
25 See LEBEUF, supra note 20 at 8 (discussing the importance of integration from an intelligence standpoint and the continued collaboration between Canada and the United States).
26 See Building Cross-Border Links: A Compendium of Canada-US Government Collaboration, supra note 19.
27 See id.
28 See generally LEBEUF, supra note 20 at 8.
29 See Noble, supra note 6.
30 See generally INTEGRATED BORDER ENFORCEMENT
STATES IBET THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 9.
31 See generally id.
32

33

See generally id.
See generally id.

TEAMS

(IBETs)

CANADA-UNITED
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Now, the IBET model. The way that it is structured in the IBET world is
that there is an International Joint Management Team. 34 There is a senior
representative from each of the five core agencies that meet quarterly along
with U.S. attorneys and Canadian Department of Justice and a smattering of
other local officials depending on where the meetings are held. This group is
responsible
essentially for the management of and oversees the IBET
35
program.
At the next level there is an International Coordination Team, which is
housed at RCMP headquarters in Ottawa,36 which consists of representatives
from all of the core agencies; 37 at least one representative from all the core
agencies, some have more. This is the group that essentially administers the
IBET program and deals with policy issues on a daily basis.38
But the most critical aspect of the IBET program is its local Joint
Management Teams. 39 These are groups of not only the five core agencies in
each of the local areas, but the all of the other law enforcement agencies in
that particular area recruited to participate in the JMT. 40 The joint
management team meets on a monthly basis to assess - to bring the
intelligence4 from its agencies, assess that intelligence, and prioritize
targeting. In some of our most productive IBET units - just to give you an
411

example - there are 13 law enforcement agencies that sit around the table.42
They discuss what the threats are in their areas, and they decide at that table
what investigations the IBET will work on. 43 There is actually
a secret vote
44
that is held once they pare it down to three investigations.
That is the level of collaboration and cooperation that we have within
some joint management teams. Now it does not mean that every agency that
sits around the table is going to participate in each investigation, but rather
those that can, those that have the resources, those that have the interest in
that particular investigation will participate.4 5 But even those that do not have
34 See Nunez-Neto, supra note 17 at 19.
" See id.
36

See id.

37 See id (describing the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams' National Coordination
Team and its organization and structure).
38 See id (discussing the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams' national Coordination
Team and its duties and responsibilities).
39 See generally id (describing IBET joint management teams' structure, organization,
responsibilities and actions).
0 See generally LEBEUF, supra note 20 (discussing the organization and effectiveness of
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams).
41 See generally id.

See generally id.
43 See generally id.
44 See generally id.
45 See generally id.
42
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an understanding of what the threats are in that area and what the local JMT
is working on. This serves to simplify so that we are not running over each
other as we move through criminal investigations. The JMT serves a very
important function, and is really at the heart of the IBET program.
Our IBET priorities are national security, organized crime, and other
border criminality.46 National security is the number one priority of all law
enforcement agencies in each of our countries.47 But the reality is that the
vast majority of what we work on in the IBET program is organized crime
files.48 And of those organized crime files, primarily smuggling organizations
with drugs being the second most common investigation in which we are
engaged.49
So the case for IBET and why it is the most appropriate model. First of
all, like all entities, law enforcement has been impacted by significant
changes in the global environment.5 0 Integrated economies, technological
advances, mobility, mass migration have obviously increased the number of
trans-border transactions that occur on a regular basis. 5 1 Organized crime has

exploited globalization, and they are more integrated than ever before.5 2 And
they are not restricted by any borders.53
Based on our IBET threat assessments, which are done collaboratively for
all our agencies, organized crime is the largest threat at the Canada-U.S.
border.5 4 They are sophisticated, and they exploit vulnerabilities in
demographics and geography.55
The picture that you see above is actually a picture of a tunnel that was
constructed between Canada and the U.S. near Aldergrove, British Columbia
under Zero Avenue. And thanks to the awareness of a CBSA officer who
noticed some people that he had had previous dealings with around the
Quonset hut in that area, we discovered this tunnel before it was completed. 6
46

IBET
47
48

IBET

See

INTEGRATED BORDER ENFORCEMENT TEAMS

(IBETS)

CANADA-UNITED

STATES

THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 9.
See generally LEBEUF, supra note 20.
See INTEGRATED BORDER ENFORCEMENT TEAMS

(IBETS)

CANADA-UNITED

STATES

THREAT ASSESSMENT,

supra note 9.

49 See id
50 See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatoty Challenge to U.S. Administra-

tive Law, 37 N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL. 695 (2005) (discussing the effects of globalization on
administrations including law enforcement).
51 See CHRISTOPHER RUDOLPH, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND HOMELAND
SECURITY: COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION IN NORTH AMERICA, 2005 L. & Bus.
REV. AM. 433, 434 (discussing migration, homeland security, and globalization).
52 See INTEGRATED BORDER ENFORCEMENT TEAMS (IBETS) CANADA-UNITED
STATES
IBET THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 9.
53 See generally id
54 See generally id
55 See generally id
56 See Terry Frieden, Drug Tunnel Found Under Canada Border, CNN NEWS, July 22,

CANADA-UNITED STATES LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 34, Vol. 1I]

You should know that law enforcement waited for it to be completed and
actually prevented the smuggling organization from smuggling contraband
during their maiden voyage through the tunnel.5 7 The second picture is just a
little snippet...
In the second photo - and we can just talk about it - but essentially you
would have seen a helicopter come down, a little video, a helicopter come
down and drop a load of narcotics as part of Project E Printer/Frozen Timber,
which occurred in British Columbia and Washington state.58 Essentially that
investigation involved a smuggling ring that would move narcotics across the
border via helicopter and drop in remote areas, remote places in the U.S.
state and national parks. 59 It was a very successful investigation led by U.S.
ICE, Washington state police, RCMP and CBSA.60
These are some of the kinds of investigations that we encounter, although
perhaps the more dramatic, but the point is that organized crime is very
adaptable. 6' If we are just positioned along the border in a line, they will go
over us, or they will go under us. 62 So we need to be integrated, intelligenceled and focus our collective resources where the intelligence demonstrates
that they would be most effective.63
Challenges for the IBET program however still exist, and those
challenges - for instance, maintaining sovereignty in an integrated world is a
constant challenge for us. In some of the remote areas, for instance in the
prairies, the nearest back-up for a law enforcement officer may be a
representative from a U.S. agency, if it is in Canada, or vice-versa. 6 4 So those
are the kind of things that we still confront and still deal with on a regular
basis. Sometimes we do not even want to know how those are dealt with to
be quite frank with you.
Other operational issues that we deal with are radio interoperability and
technology acquisition.65 All of these things that we are trying to build to be
2005, available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/JS/07/21/border.tunnel/index.html (last visited
Oct. 12, 2008).
17 See id.
58 See generally

Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) 2006 Joint Cross-Border
Operations, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/security/ibetssuccesse.htm (last visited Oct. 11,
2008).
'9 See id.
60 See generally id.
61 See INTEGRATED BORDER ENFORCEMENT TEAMS (IBETs) CANADA-UNITED STATES
IBET THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 9.
62 See id.
63 See generally id.
64 See generally id (discussing how the U.S. and Canada agencies have worked together
and been successful and also where they need to cooperate more).
65

See generally INTEGRATED BORDER ENFORCEMENT TEAMS (IBETS) CANADA-UNITED

STATES IBET THREAT ASSESSMENT, supra note 9.
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a modem integrated police entity. Whereas before we only had to worry
about the acquisition process in one agency, now we are looking at five
agencies and attempting to ensure that everything we deliver to the field is
interoperable or at least has open architecture so that sometime down the
road we will be able to integrate our technological assets.66
Another challenge is from a policy standpoint. There are different
agencies, different mandates, and different policies on information sharing,
something which has a very big issue for both countries.6 7 These issues take
time and education for each of our agencies to try and get it right.68 And I am
not saying that we have it right yet, but I think we are moving a lot closer to
that now.
And then finally, legal challenges. I am not going to touch upon that too
much right now other than to say there are a multitude of legal and regulatory
issues.69 If we are going to become more integrated, then perhaps legislative
changes will be required in order to make us more effective.7 °
I am also pleased to report that our two countries are presently in the
negotiation stages of an agreement designed specifically to address many of
these policy and legal issues that I have alluded to here today, but only in the
marine security law enforcement operations area.7' We are hopeful that some
of the barriers to greater integration will be resolved as we move forward
with these negotiations and have a bi-national agreement in the security
marine environment.
So when we talk of IBET successes; timely intelligence, sharing of
intelligence, leveraging of resources, these are the kind of things that we
believe we bring to the table. Law enforcement recognizes that border
integrity is crucial to ensuring economic security and the public safety of
Canada and the United States.7 2 We also recognize that no one agency,
66

See CANADA-UNITED

STATES BORDER DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT,

supra note 2, 1-2

(discussing the many agencies cooperating and some of the issues facing them from the perspective of both sides of the border).
67

See generally REPORT OF THE CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY

CANADA-UNITED

STATES

INTER-PARLIAMENTARY

GROUP

TO

DELEGATION OF THE

THE

CANADIAN/U.S.

BORDER: Au UNIFIED Focus CAN/AM BORDER TRADE ALLIANCE (2006) available at

http://vw.parl.gc.ca/ILAPublications/index-E.aspx?sectionpage=1149_1 (last visited Oct. 12,
2008) (discussing the different problems that need to be resolved between the United States
and Canada in order to ensure better cooperation).
68 See generally id.
69 See generally id.
70 See generally id.
71 See generally Canadian Press, Marine Security Riddled with Gaps: Whistleblower, CBC
NEWS, Jan. 23, 2008, availableat
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/01/23/transportcanada.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2008)
(Discussing issues in the Canadian Marine Security program).
72 See generally LEBEUF, supra note 20 (discussing the efforts of law enforcement agencies to help secure the Canada United States border).
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entity, or country has the wherewithal to get all of it right and to eliminate all
of the threats.7 3
We need to make our limited resources more effective. We need naivetd's
such as IBET to make our operations more interoperable so that we can share
information in real time across organizations and across borders and focus on
common goals to ensure that the four pillars of the Smart Border Declaration
are sturdy,74and that the Canada-U.S. border remains open to trade and
commerce.
Just some final thoughts. Securing the border does not start or stop at the
physical border.75 It requires a seamless multilayered approach.76 And finally
we must continue the progression from mere coordination to integration,
leveraging, and maximizing intelligence, technology, and resources.77
Thank you.
MS. MATTHIESEN: Thanks, Warren. We are going to hold the questions
until the very end if you do not mind.
And we are going to bring the focus back to the actual port of entry. IBET
teams as you probably have realized operate in between ports of entries.78
The two border agencies at ports of entry are U.S. Customs and Border
Protection and CBSA, 79 and I am pleased now to give the mike to Mr. Todd
Owen.

73 See generally id (noting the highly collaborative efforts of many different agencies from

both Canada and the United States).
74 See generally id (discussing how the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams help achieve
the bi-national goals of integration and collaboration).
75 See id (discussing the need to collaborate at all levels because the threat exists at all
levels).
76

See id.

71 See id.
78

IBET

See

INTEGRATED BORDER ENFORCEMENT TEAMS

THREAT ASSESSMENT

(IBETs)

CANADA-UNITED

STATES

(2007), supra note 9 (discussing Integrated Border Enforcement

Teams and their operation localities).
79 See generally id (discussing agencies that support the Integrated Border Enforcement
Teams).
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UNITED STATES SPEAKER
Todd C. Owent

MR. OWEN: Thank you. Well, good afternoon everybody. It is a pleasure
to be here and to speak to you a little bit about some of the cargo security
programs that U.S. Customs and Border Protection has in place today to both
help secure the border as well as to facilitate legitimate trade and travel.
And I would like to pick up on a theme that Warren started with the
importance of an intelligence-driven, data-driven, multilayered seamless
approach to securing the borders. I am going to focus mostly on the cargo
aspect of this, and I think most of you are familiar with who U.S. Customs
and Border Protection is and how we came to be created after the Department
of Homeland Security was established in March of 2003.80 We combined the
inspection resources from the former U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration
Naturalization Service, and the Department of Agriculture quarantine
inspection. 81 Their inspectors, as well as the Office of the Border Patrol, the
three previous groups, Customs, INS, and Agriculture work at the ports of
entry whereas Border Patrol worked between the ports of entry.82
And to give you an idea on the scope of the challenges that CBP faces. On
a typical day we have over 1.1 million passengers and pedestrians that gain
entry into the country. 83 653,000 of them do so, 84 and they are foreign
t Todd C. Owen is the Executive Director of the Cargo and Conveyance Security Office
within U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office of Field Operations. As the Executive
Director for the Cargo and Conveyance Security (CCS) Office since May 2006, Mr. Owen is
directly responsible for all cargo security programs and policies for CBP. Included within the
CCS Office are the Container Security Initiative Office, the Secure Freight Initiative Office,
the Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology Office (which includes radiation detection equipment and large scale imaging equipment, policies, and programs), the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program (C-TPAT) Office, the national Canine Enforcement Program,
the Cargo Verification Office which manages cargo enforcement policies and activities with
the U.S. Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration, the Cargo Control
Office which oversees trade security policies and programs including in-bond, manifest and
carrier compliance programs, and the National Targeting Center for Cargo, located in Northern Virginia. Previously, Mr. Owen was the Director of the C-TPAT program.
80 See generally Customs and Border Protection Today: One Team, One Fight,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2003/March/one.xml (last visited Sept. 30, 2008)
(providing extensive information on the creation of U.S. Customs and Border Protection).
81 See id.
82 See generally id.
83

See

generally

US

Customs

and

Border

Protection,

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/mission/cbpis.xml (last visited Sept. 30, 2008) (describing the activity that United States Customs and Border Control sees on a daily basis).
84 See generally id
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visitors into the country. We have over 70,000 truck, rail, and sea containers
that enter the country every day,85 and 304,000 personally-owned vehicles.86
On an average day we see at least 2,200 pounds of narcotics at the ports of
entry, and 5,100 pounds between the ports of entry.87 And that is a significant
role when you look at what the IBETs are doing for that smuggling avenue
that occurs between the legitimate border crossings.88
We also refuse entry to over 800 aliens who are attempting to enter the
United States and found inadmissible, 89 and these are the ones who presented
themselves at the official port of entries, not the individuals that are
interdicted by the border patrol trying to cross between the ports. 90 And we
deploy over 1,100 K-9 teams, 10,000 vehicles, 267 aircraft, 175 watercraft,
and 188 horse teams on the borders, so we have quite a challenge if you look
at what we are doing every single day. 9'
To meet that challenge, we employ a multilayered enforcement strategy
again which starts with the advanced data that we receive.92 Under various
pieces of the legislation, starting with the Trade Act of 2002, U.S. Customs
began to require advanced submission of electronic manifest data. 93 That
information helps us to target before the cargo either arrives in the country or
is even laid onboard a vessel in a foreign port as in the case of Maritime
94
cargo.

That advanced information is run through a complement of our automated
targeting systems, and every single shipment that is coming into the United
States is screened for risk before it even gets here.95 That way we can direct
the limited resources that we do have into those, again, 70,000 containers,
truck and rail, every day that pose the greatest risk, and those are the ones
that we can target for inspection.
We have two national targeting centers, both in Northern Virginia - one
that focuses solely on passengers, one that focuses solely on cargo, and they
add another layer to what we are doing to again help screen all the cargo
96
before it arrives in the United States.
85

See generally id.
See generally id.
87 See generally id.
86
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See generally INTEGRATED
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CANADA-UNITED

STATES IBET THREAT ASSESSMENT, supranote 9.
89 See generally US Customs and Border Protection, supra note 83.
90 See generally id.

91 See generally id.
92 See generally id.
93 See generally E-Manifest Gateway,
http://www.ecustoms.com/vg/e-manifestgateway.cfm (last visited Oct. 7, 2008) (describing the electronic manifest data system).
94 See generally id.
95 See generally id.
96 See generally id.
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With that advanced manifest information, that was a good starting point
back in 2002. 97 But over the last few years, CBP has realized that in order to
enhance our targeting to better identify the high-risk shipments and facilitate
98
the low-risk recurring shipments, we can benefit from even greater data.
We have an initiative underway now that you may have heard of called the
10+2 Security Filing, and this is a move to require importers to submit 10
additional data elements prior to the loading of the foreign vessel. 99
Information is such as where is the container stuffed, who is doing that
information °° - additional pieces of data that identify the entities involved in
each of these shipments.'
From the sea carriers, we are requiring electronic transmission of the
stowage plans, the mapping, if you will, of all the containers that are on a
certain vessel. 10 2 From that we can automatically identify any cargo that has
not been declared - you know, that container that was added on at the last
minute that CBP and that the Coast Guard may not be aware of. 10 3 So even
though we start with the data, we realize that we further enhance that process,
and we have that move underway now known as the Security Filing 10+2.
So with that data, once we determine the shipment is high-risk, we can
either order what is called a do-not-load order, which keeps the cargo from
being loaded onboard the vessel, 1°4 or we can look at it overseas as part of
10 5
or we can look at it when the cargo arrives
our container security initiative,
06
here in the United States.
I would like to talk a little bit about our CSI program. Under the
Container Security Initiative, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers
are deployed overseas at up to - we are at 58 seaports now around the
world. 10 7 The first CSI deployment occurred in February of 2002 in

97 See generally id.
98 See generally Security Filing 10+2,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargosecurity/carriers/security filing (follow "Security
Filing, 10+2 Regulatory Assessment and Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis for the Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 11, 2008) (providing information regarding the 10+2 filing initiative which acts to facilitate trade).
99 See generally id.
1oo See generally id.
101 See generally id.
102 See generally id.
103 See generally id.
104 See generally id.
in
Brief,
CSI
generally
105 See
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargosecurity/csi/csi-in-brief.xml (last visited on Oct. 7,
2008) (providing general information on the initiative).
106 See generally id.
107 See generally id.
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Vancouver,' °8 and that was followed by deployments in Montreal and
Halifax.'° 9
So now we have an opportunity in 58 countries around the world where
we have over 200 officers permanently stationed to identify the high-risk
shipments and examine them before they are even laid onboard a vessel
coming to the United States."10 And that is not only a great security benefit,
but it is also a great trade facilitation benefit."' Prior to these types of
actions, if you had a very hot suspect container on a ship that caused a great
deal of concern, working with the Coast
Guard, we often kept that ship
2
outside of the port to address that risk." 1
Here we have an opportunity to address that risk before the container's
onboard so that everybody else's containers that are on that ship are not
unnecessarily held up. So the Container Security Initiative really is an
enhancement to the security the U.S. has in place. 1 3 In 2006 we conducted
over 78,000 of these high-risk inspections overseas, and in 2007 that almost
doubled to 137,000.114
So clear are the benefits of having U.S. officers overseas working with
our host countries to identify the high-risk shipments, look at them, make
sure they do not pose a threat before they get put on a cargo ship and they get
mixed in with the general trade.
Whether the inspection is conducted overseas or here in the United States,
we have a full complement of inspection technology that allows us to quickly
facilitate that examination, and if there are no concerns, move the cargo
through." 15 We have large-scale nonintrusive inspection equipments. 116 These
are the large x-ray and gamma ray systems you may have seen." 7 We have
almost 200 of those deployed at our land borders as well as at our seaports.18
We also now have a full complement of radiation portal monitors in all of
our land border and our seaport ports of entry. 1 9 The first radiation portal
108
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109 See generally id.
110 See generally id.
111 See generally id.
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See generally id.

114 See generally id.
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See generally id.

117 See generally id.
11
See generally Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection
Equipment,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03235t.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
9 See
generally,
Mobile
Radiation
Portal
Monitors,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/systems/mobile-rpm.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
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monitor was deployed in October of 2002,120 and we have over 1,100 of them
deployed today.' 2' And what that gives us is that 100 percent of the trucks
that arrived from Mexico are scanned for radiation before it leaves the
border.12 2 From Canada we are at 91 percent, and we will reach 97 percent by
the end of this calendar year. 123 We have 84 more radiation portal monitors
going in over the summer. 124 We have three times as many land border
crossings with Canada as we do for Mexico, 125 so it is a greater challenge to
get a lot of those smaller crossings equipped with the technology that we
need. And in our U.S. seaports, we now scan 98 percent of
the Maritime
126
cargo when it gets off the ship before it enters the commerce.
Eighteen months ago we were only scanning 37 percent.' 27 So you can see
here's a great significant improvement of the security of the United States.
And since we started this program, we have now screened over 243 million
conveyances, 28 and we have resolved 1.4 million alarms. 129 And to give you

an idea on the impact of the workload on the CBP officers in the port of
Long Beach, the largest seaport in the United States, 30 we resolve 400 to 500
alarms every day. 13 We have a team of about a hundred officers over the
three shifts that all they do is resolve these radiation portal alarms.

32

So this

120 See Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment
in the United States and in Other Countries, http://www.gao.gov/htext/d05840t.html (last
visited Sept. 25, 2008).
121 See Vayl Oxford, Speech at IFPA-Fletcher Conference (Sept. 26, 2007).
122 See generally Robert C. Bonner, Remarks at Kansas City Chamber of Commerce (May
16, 2005).
123
124
125

See Vayl Oxford, supra note 121.
See generally Mobile Radiation Portal Monitors, supra note 119.
See US Department of Transportation, JWC US./Mexico Border TransportationPlan-

ning, (Jan./Feb. 2005) availableat
http://www.borderplanning.fhwa.dot.gov/currentarticlel .asp (stating, "[T]ruck crossings at
the U.S.-Canada border reached 13.3 million, and truck crossings from Mexico into the United
States reached 4.2 million in 2003.).
126 See generally Ben Bain, Commerce Versus Security, FCW, July 7, 2008,
http://www.fcw.com/print/22 20/features/153046-l.html?type=pf (last visited Oct. 12, 2008).
INl See Vayl S. Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office of DHS, Speech at
House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global
Counterterrorism: SAFE Port Act: Status of Implementation One Year Later (Oct. 11, 2007).
128 See generally Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: HearingBefore the S. Comm. On Homeland Sec. and Gov 't Affairs, 110th Cong. (Sept. 25, 2008) (Testimony by Thomas S. Winkowski, Assist. Commissioner).
129 See generally id.
130

See generally Dan Keane, Mexico's Seaport, WASHINGTON TIMES, Sept. 3, 2008, avail-

able at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/sep/03/mexicos-seaport/ (last visited Oct.
12, 2008).
131 See generally Preventing-NuclearTerrorismsupra note 128.
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See id
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is a great effort to help secure the United States, but it is a significant impact
on our resources.
So if you look at the CSI deployments where we have officers overseas,
we have the radiation equipment and we have the imaging technology.133 The
next natural evolution of these programs is what concept that has come to be
known as 100 percent scanning. 134 You may have heard of this.
We have two recent pieces of legislation in the United States. The Safe
Port Act in October of 2006 that required CBP to go out and test the concept
of 100 percent scanning at the foreign locations. 131 Scanning according to the
legislation means the36 radiation read as well as the imaging to see what is
inside the container. 1
A significant amount of challenges that come with this from a technical
standpoint, an infrastructure standpoint within your ports all the way down to
the political and the diplomatic things like weather.! 37 Under the Safe Port
Act where we were required to go out and pilot this on a three-location
basis, 138 we have been operational since October of 2007 in Qasim, Pakistan,
in Cortez, Honduras, and in South Hampton in the U.K. 139 And in those three
locations, a hundred percent of the containers go through a radiation scan, go
through an imaging, before they are put on a vessel destined to the United
States. 4' 0
Those three locations are primarily gate traffic. It is easy to control this
type of activity if you have a single choke point where everything is going to
come through. The real challenge comes in the Singapores, the Hong Kongs
where you have significant trained shipment where it moves from one vessel
to another and never really comes through an entrance port at a gate.
So to test that, we have smaller scale pilots going on in Hong Kong right
now. We will be going live in Korea and in Salalah, Oman by the end of
May. 14 1 And then we have some work underway to get us in Singapore as
133 See generally An Overall Picture of Port Security,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact-sheets/port-security/securing-us-ports.xml
visited Sept. 25, 2008).
134
135
136

(last

See generally id.
See generally id.

See generally H.R. 4954 (Enrolled-Bill),

http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlc109/h4954_enr.xml (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
13
See generally GlobalSecurity.org, Homeland Security: SBInet,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/sbinet.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
138 See generally Steward Baker, Assistant Sec'y of DHS, Speech before the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: One Year Later: A Progress Report on the
SAFE Port Act (Oct. 16, 2007).
139 See generally id.
140 See generallyAn Overall Picture of Port Security, supra note 133.
141 See generally,Report to Congress on Integrated Scanning System Pilots (Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Section 231),
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well. 142 That is really going to give us additional data to test how well this
concept works.
It is very challenging. The IT infrastructures in many of these developing
countries do not support this type of technology, 143 so there is a cost incurred
with bringing it up-to-date all the way down to things like the weather.' 44 In
Qasim, it is so hot there in the summer that the non-intrusive inspection
equipment would just shut down. 145 It was not built for those extreme heats,
so we had to build a special canopy to try to keep it cool. 146 And then you
have things like the political unrest that we experience in Pakistan quite
frequently where the cables will be cut, and there will be things like that. So
there is a lot of challenges that went into this. Again, the Safe Port Act said
go ahead and pilot this and take the lessons learned, and come back to
Congress and let us see what the path forward will be.
Then the 9/11 Commission Act that was passed a year later in August of
2007 basically trumped the Safe Port go-out-and-pilot-this and said do 100
percent of all containers by 2012.147 So this is a huge significant challenge to
have over 700 seaports around the world that export cargo to the United
States. 48 I do not think it is feasible that we would ever been be in 700
locations for exactly the reasons we mentioned - the technical, the
infrastructure, the political, types of things like that.
So we are trying to be responsive to the 9/11 Act legislation. We are
going to further these pilots and see the lessons that can be learned, and then
figure out a way to go forth as part of risk management approach more likely
in high-risk trade corridors like the Qasim, Pakistan situation where it makes
sense to deploy that type of equipment in a very high-risk environment. Do
you need that array of technology, the costs that are incurred at every seaport
around the world? I would think not. But again, this is a big issue that is
under debate within the United States. The trade community is very opposed
to this because of the impact that it will have on the throughput of these
ports, the additional costs that will be incurred. But again, U.S. Customs
Border Protection, we have to be responsive to the legislative act that is out
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/-files/SFIReportPublicRelease
(last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
142
143

FINALConsolidated.pdf

See generally id
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144 See generally id

145 See generally Weather: Karachi, Pakistan,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/weather/world/cityguides/results.shtmil?tt-TT002700 (last visited Oct.
11,2008).
146 See generally id.
147 See generally The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our Nation's Seaports,
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0886t.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
I8 See generally Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.Bound Cargo Containers, http://www.gao.gov/htext/d08533t.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
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there so we are working towards how we can adopt 100 percent scanning in
certain high-risk trade corridors as we go forward through here.
The last program that I just want to touch upon is the Customs Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism program, C-TPAT 1 49 This is the last piece of
our layered enforcement strategy, and this really is our industry partnership
program with the trade. CBP has long recognized that in order to secure the
national trade supply chains, we cannot do this alone.1 50 We need the help of
other governments. That is how we, you know, started things with the
container security initiative. We need to help with industry, and that was
what we are doing within C-TPAT. 15 '
Under C-TPAT, we have clearly defined minimum-security criteria that
U.S. importers and service providers, such as carriers, must adopt."i 2 The
53
adoption of these security practices makes their supply chains more secure.'
Once we go out and conduct onsite validations to make sure that the security
measures they claimed to have adopted are in fact in place, then we can go
ahead and treat that supply chain as low-risk and afford it fewer inspections.
Today we have over 8,300 members in this program, and we have
conducted over 7,600 validations. 154 So 7,600 times, teams of U.S., CBP,
supply chain security specialists working with the partners, with the
companies that import into the United States conduct a physical onsite
evaluation from the point of stuffing a container where those goods are made
all the way through their supply chain and look for security deficiencies and
155
then work for ways to close the hole.
So then here again, here's another program that is working 7,600 times.
We have worked in partnership to identify the weaknesses and tighten those
holes. We have conducted these validations in 87 countries around the
149 See generally What
is
Customs-Trade
Partnership
Against
Terrorism,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargosecurity/ctpat/whatctpat/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
1 0 See generally Maritime Cargo Security In The Age Of Global Terrorism,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroomihighlights/trade-news/cargosecurity.xml(last visited

Oct. 6, 2008).
151 See generally Fact Sheet: C-TPAT,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact-sheets/port-security/ctpat sheet.xml (last visited
Oct. 6, 2008).
152 See Minimum-Security Criteria for C-TPAT Foreign Manufacturers in English,

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo-security/ctpat/security criteria/sec-criteria-foreignmfc/foreign mfc securitycriteria.xml (last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
153 See generally id.
154 See C-TPAT Program Addresses Exports, GAO Fixes,

http://www.americanshipper.com/fc/FLC story.asp?news=95898 (last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
1 5 See generally CHARLES BROWNSTEIN ET AL., HOMELAND SECURITY INSTITUTE,
REPORT
OF THE DHS NATIONAL SMALL VESSEL SECURITY SUMMIT (Oct. 19, 2007),

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/smallvesselNSVSSReportHQ_508.pdf (last visited
Oct. 12, 2008).
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world.1 56 And again this is an anti-terrorism program. We are not going to the
garden spots. I mean, we are doing Bangladesh in August and some - you
know, there are no trips to Paris in the springtime under this program, so it is
a very intensive program. We have over 200 officers that are dedicated just
to this program. We have recently opened a new office in Buffalo, New York
to help greatly facilitate the interaction with the Canadian trade
environment. 57 A third of the members in C-TPAT are Canadian truckers or
Canadian importers, so that is our largest partnership group if you will.1 58
That is why we have established a new office in Buffalo to quickly facilitate
that.
So what I wanted to do hopefully this afternoon is give you an idea on
some of the cargo security programs that CBP has in place, how they all are
interacted, and our approach being that any one layer can be defeated, but
through multiple layers, the likelihood of success is greatly diminished.
Thank you.
MS. MATTHIESEN: Thanks, Todd. I am really hoping there are going to
be very good questions after this panel. The last speaker, but not the least, is
Joy Aldous from the Canadian Border Services Agency.' 59
CANADIAN SPEAKER
Joy Aldoust
MS. ALDOUS: Thank you very much. Good afternoon everyone.
I am very, very happy to be here today to talk about border security. I
have been with the agency, the Canada Border Services Agency, for about 30
156
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visited Oct. 12, 2008).
157 See generally CBP.gov, Buffalo Station,
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or ny/stations/buffalo.xml (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
I-8 See generally C-TPAT Cost/Benefit Survey 2007,
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f (last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
159 See Border Commercial Consultative Committee Record of Meeting (Feb. 26 - 27,
2008),
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/consultfbccc-ccacf/2008-02-26-eng.html
(last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
Joy Aldous is the Director of the Licensing, Export and Accounting Policy Division in
the Admissibility Branch of the Canada Border Services Agency. She has over 30 years of
experience in the agency and has contributed to many initiatives including Customs Self Assessment, ACROSS, Titan and the Customs Commercial System.
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years under various names. 60 We were created in 2003 under the public
61
safety mandate to integrate almost identically to what the Americans did. 1
We are under the public safety umbrella, which not surprisingly, as it
absolutely makes sense, was aligned very, very similarly to the U.S. 162 This

facilitates many things: for example the exchange of information allows us to
talk about common problems where an organizational structure is not your
biggest issue. But we have an enormous responsibility. All of us do. Both
sides of the fence: business and government. It is a constant balancing act
between security and facilitation, and it really does require innovation,
cooperation, and flexibility.' 63 And I know you guys do not think we are very
flexible, but we try to wear two hats wherever possible.
But we have to recognize the synergy between these two things, between
access and security. An accessible border can only be maintained if
Canadians and Americans are satisfied with the underlying level of security,
its costs, its respect for personal and economic freedoms. 164 We were all
raised on those. They are basic values within our system, our economies. 165
Under the Smart Border Accord that was implemented seven years ago,
we have done everything we can within our country to work with the U.S. in
an effective joint approach to the border. 166 We understand that having
different requirements increases cost for trade.
Some of the presentations this morning talked about the large percentage
of businesses where there is a Canadian corporation and an American
corporation. They trade between them. And we have to recognize that and
accept it, but we have not been able to match the U.S. with everything. As I
was listening to his impressive list of staff and equipment, I was only
dreaming that we could be even so close, we have to do a little bit less with a

160
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visited Oct. 6, 2008).
162 See generally id.
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1 See generally Joint Statement by President Bush, President Calderon, Prime Minister
Harper, The White House (April 22, 2008), available at
http://www.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/PressReleasesFactSheets/PROD0
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See generally id.
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sited Oct. 6, 2008).
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little bit less money. We also have to dispel the myth that Canada has a
more-relaxed view on border security. 167 That is absolutely not the case.
Let me just talk a little bit about how we look at security, and surprisingly
enough, you are going to hear exactly the same words that you have heard
from everybody. We have three fundamental strategies. First is to receive
advanced information, electronic information on who and what is coming to
our country. 168 Same as the Americans. Second, turning that information into
intelligence using sophisticated risk assessment systems.' 69 There was a lot of
discussion this morning about setting a score. We are there; we are doing it.
And third of course - and really also very, very important especially to you is building secure access programs such as NEXUS, 170 such as FAST so that
we can stop spending the time on the lower risk shipments and concentrate
on the areas of high-risk. 17 1 Absolutely essential.
So we have a multiple borders approach. Heard this term already. We are
trying to push out the border wherever possible. It is been mentioned already.
Our migration integrity officer network, it works overseas to intercept
improperly documented travelers before they get to Canada. 172 There has
been 45,000 already that we have stopped before they got here. 73 We also
collaborate on the U.S. perimeter security to facilitate and accelerate the
travel of people
and goods across the land to their ultimate North American
74
destination.1
Well, there has been no great policy or political advancement that would
differentiate between the perimeter and the 49th parallel. Many of our
policies do that. When we sit there and think where is the biggest risk, where
should we be dedicating our resources, certainly an offshore situation is
almost always higher.
We have the same systems and processes in place as you just heard from
my colleague. We have joint targeting in our national risk assessment

167
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center. 175 We get the advance cargo information on our container ships and
the timeframes for advanced information for cargo, for marine and air mode
are harmonized with the Americans.1 76 Our process for "hold for more
information" is very similar because the shippers coming to the country do
not want to have 15 different systems if they can avoid it. So wherever
possible, we do try to harmonize processes, data elements. Certainly cannot
be identical, but we do try. We try to use the same message maps, the same
standards, the same communication language.
Our multiple border philosophy also means that most of our trade
programs and revenue collection activity occurs away from the border inland,
and we have been moving more and more towards concentrating our front
line officers' concentration on determining admissibility.1 77 Is there a health,
safety, or security risk? We let the other stuff happen later. And we have
been working very hard with trade to continue to do that. Number one, not to
congest the border, and number two, to meet our financial responsibility as
we also collect significant revenue. Although the money is not secondary, it
can be managed, we believe in a different way using audit-based processes
after the fact.
And finally, multiple borders mean working in the Canadian communities
with our security partners to prevent smuggling of guns and drugs, and to
detain and remove individuals who pose a danger to the public.1 78 So many
different fronts we are working on. But we have a particularly rich tradition
of cooperation with the U.S. from free trade through the smart border onto
1 79
the security and prosperity partnership (SPP)
But the U.S. does have more money. You are a lot bigger than we are. We
are sort of the poor cousin. But it makes us very, very careful and I think
very strategic in terms of where we invest our funds. But I do know we need
to do more to ensure that the 49th parallel accommodates an efficient, secure
two-way street for both travel and commerce.
The recent Canada-U.S. Chambers of Commerce report has been
mentioned a few times already today: reducing border costs while
strengthening security.180 While many of the recommendations are actually
See generally Canada Border Services Agency: National Risk Assessment Centre,
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/media/facts-faits/039-eng.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2008).
6 See generally id.
177 See generally Chris Thatcher, Connecting Data Points: The National Risk Assessment
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179 See
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very consistent with the direction for SPP, we do recognize that as the report
8
asserts, border dependent businesses cannot wait for long-term solutions,' 1
and we 82
must work on a daily basis to further prevent that thickening of the
border.
The U.S. Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, WHTI, 183 has also been
mentioned today, and that was a particular flash point for one of our bilateral
challenges over this last year.1 84 We have worked very hard to ensure that
Canadians are aware of this. They are informed, and they are prepared for the
new requirements in order to facilitate the implementation. We are very
85
pleased that the U.S. agreed to delay that until June '09 for land and water,1
mainly because the percentage of population that use
those modes with
186
passports was much, much lower than the other modes.
But as of June, we will be required - Canadians - to present a valid
passport, a NEXUS or FAST card when we enter the U.S. 87 We are very
encouraged that negotiations have led to lowering this requirement for
children and that a birth certificate will be acceptable for children. 88 And
that we continue to discuss the possibility of the acceptance of a secure
certificate of Indian status card or Canadian enhanced driver's license. 189 Our
province of British Columbia has announced that they are implementing a
more sophisticated card with security measures, and we have signed a
memorandum of understanding with Customs Border Protection dealing with
information sharing so that we can share the information we have collected
on the driver's licenses. 190
Strengthening
http://www.uschamber.com/publications/reports/0802_findingbalance.htm
6, 2008)
181
182

See id.
See id.

183

See State.gov, Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative,

Security,
(last visited Oct.

http://travel.state.gov/travel/cbpmc/cbpmc 2223.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
1 4 See generally David H. Wilkins, U.S. Ambassador to Canada, Remarks at Tourism
Association
of
Nova
Scotia
(Dec.
4,
2006),
available
at
http://ottawa.usembassy.gov/content/textonly.asp?section=embconsul&document=-wilkins-12
0406 (last visited Oct. 12, 2008).
185 See Documents for Travel to the United States Chronology, http://www.cbsaasfc.gc.ca/whti-ivho/chron-eng.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
186 See generally NPR.org, U.S. Passport Relief May Come Too Late for
Many,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=10876269 (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
1 7 See generally Documents for Entry into the United States, http://www.cbsaasfc.gc.ca/whti-ivho/tourist-touriste-eng.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
188 See generally DHS.gov, Crossing U.S. Borders,
http://www.dhs.gov/xtrvlsec/crossingborders/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
189 Documents for Entry into the United States, supra note 187.
190 See generally Privacy Impact Assessments: High-Risk Traveler Identification Initiative,
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/reports-rapports/pia-efvp/hrti-ivre-20051003-
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And we will continue to engage our federal partners in this project. It has
huge potential impact to our economy. 91 People were talking about families,
families who live on either side of the border. These changes are huge
cultural changes I believe, and we are hoping that we can move forward in a
common-sense way.
NEXUS. NEXUS is a wonderful example of what can be achieved
working together with the U.S. to more efficiently process low-risk
travelers. 192 And again, that frees us to spend our time looking at the stuff
that should be higher risk. NEXUS has now been implemented at all major
Canadian airports and harmonized against the modes, air, land, and
marine.193 It verifies the low-risk status of the participant.' 94 There is a really
95 It is one application for two countries.1 96
exhaustive risk assessment done.' 197
And it actually uses iris technology.
NEXUS uses 260 characteristics of the eyeball to identify who the
machine is talking to.' 98 Great idea. Our membership is up to 185,000 now, 199
of which four and five are in this room. We recently also got another $17
million from our federal budget to further expand this program. 200
We have an initiative called e-Manifest which lines up quite closely with
ACE, 20 1 which is going to now mandate the pre-arrival electronic information
in the rail and marine modes, both from carriers, freight forwarders, and
importers.2 °2 Radiation detection as well, we talked about that. U.S. Customs
has talked about that. We as well will have our implementation completed
this year at all our major marine ports.
eng.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
191 See generally Todd Hataley, Catastrophic Terrorism at the Border: The Case of the
Canada-United States Border, HOMELAND SEC. AFFAIRS J., Sept. 1, 2007,
htt://www.hsaj.org/?special:fullarticle=supplement. 1.2 (last visited Oct. 12, 2008).
1 2 See Border Access Improvement Projects: Southbound FAST and NEXUS Lanes,
http://www.wcog.org/Completed-Border-Projects/FAST-And-NEXUS-Lanes/204.aspx
(last
visited Oct. 9, 2008).
193 See generallyNEXUS Centre Opens in Falls, http://www.fftimes.com/node/214519 (last
visited Oct. 9, 2008).
194 See generally id.
195 See generally id.
196 See generally id.
197 See generally Iris-scan Technology,
http://www.edmontonsun.com/News/Edmonton/2007/09/14/pf-4497893.html (last visited Oct.
9, 2008).
198 See generally id.
199 Border Access Improvement Projects, supra note 192.
200 See generally Notes for an Address to the House of Commons Budget Debate (Mar. 3,
2008), http://www.gordbrown.com/EN/6850/68648.
201 See generally ECustoms.com, A Powerful Web-based E-Manifest Solution,
http://www.ecustoms.com/vg/e-manifest-gateway.cfm (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
2 See generally id.
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We have a PIP program, Partners in Protection, which as of this June will
receive mutual recognition with the United States C-TPAT program.2 °3 It is a
first step, it is not what we had hoped to achieve. We had dreamed of a
NEXUS-type process where there is one application, both countries do the
risk assessment, and either they are in or out. But it is defined as
compatibility or similarity between the programs. The minimum standard
requirements will be met, the validations will be met, and it is a critical first
step in moving forward. Once again trying to make it as simple as possible,
especially for businesses that use the same supply chains. They are just
located on different sides of the border.
We also have an initiative with the OGD, Other Government Department,
single window, where we are trying to address the extensive information
by trade by the very many agencies that are involved
requirements required
24
in government. 0
We are basically going to move towards a single electronic message that
will then be shared with all the appropriate partners, the other governments'
agencies. It will eliminate some of the final barriers we have to fool
electronic commerce with paper permits.20 5 The other government
departments will have to "go EDI or die.",20 6 We are taking the position that
other government agencies must move to electronic processes. We cannot
manage in a paper world anymore.
We have also just recently announced some amendments to the Customs
Act to strengthen border security that will allow us to more effectively
implement our Customs control areas to designate areas such as ports or
207
airports. Right now, for anybody coming up to Customs, we can question
and examine whatever goods they have on them, but if they are working in
the airport and walking through these zones, we do not have that authority
other than when they leave.
And we have concerns about false documents, for example, changing
hands between cleaning staff and passengers arriving in the country, and so

203

See generally U.S., Canada Sign PIP/C-TPAT Cargo Security Mutual Recognition Ar-

rangement, http://www.brokerpower.com/snippets/2008/08070215.html (last visited Oct. 9.
2008).
204 See
generally Exporters: Other Government Departments - Requirements,
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/export/ogdr-eam-eng.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
Activity: Science and Technology-based Innovation,
2 5 See generally Program
(last visited
http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/0708/bsa-asf/bsa-asf-PR-eng.asp?printable=True
Oct. 9, 2008).
206 See
generally Electronic Commerce, http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/eservices/menueng.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
207 See generally The Government of Canada Proposes Amendments to the Customs Act to
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gov.gc.ca/media/releaseSecurity,
Border
Strengthen
communique/2008/2008-02-15-eng.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
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we have got that legislation moving forward that will now allow us to
question and search people within the areas.
Another initiative and support of Canadian competitiveness is the
Canadian government business burden reduction project.20 8 We have to
reduce our "musts, shalls, and wills" by 20 percent. It is a huge job for
government because we like "musts, shalls, or wills." We like data elements,
we like forms. And since the front end of the process, the pre-arrival process,
will see an increase in our reporting requirements, we need to drastically
reduce what has to be done after the fact.
Looking at this very, very hard, CBSA, our agency, has 8,000
requirements. 20 9 And we are supposed to have it done by November this year.
I am afraid we will not meet the 20 percent by November this year, but we
are taking this very, very seriously because we do see cost to business, our
government sees as an absolute key in surviving in this world. Business
simplification then - very important. We have a safe third country
agreement, 2 ° new bilateral issue between Canada and the U.S. on the
immigration side, under which persons seeking refugee protection must
normally make a claim in the first country they arrive in. 2 11 There was a legal
challenge, and the legal challenge was upheld.212 We are appealing that
challenge. 213 And until a final decision is made - I believe it is the end of
May that the date has been set - we can still maintain the existing process.
That change will create some new challenges and flashpoints. A border
vision. The time and energy we spend on managing specific border issues
really says you always have to work ahead, to a long-term vision of where
you are going to go. We have started consultations with trade on a
commercial vision for 2017, l4 so basically 10 years down the road. It will
guide our planning and investment in the commercial program - that is goods
coming into the country - over the next 10 years. It will make sure that both

208

See generally Canada Border Services Advisory Committee Meeting Summary,

http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/consult/cbsac-ccsfc/2008-04-17-eng.html
visited Oct. 9, 2008).
209 See generally Ensuring Compliance in Your Supply Chain,

(last

http://www.caie.ca/events/2008/emergingissues/2008-Semi-Annual-Brochure-04-17.pdf (last
visited Oct. 9, 2008).
210 See generally Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement, http://www.cbsaasfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/stca-etps-eng.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
211
212

Id.

See generally Rabble.ca, Safe Third Country

Ruling Overturned on Appeal,

httP://www.rabble.ca/news full story.shtml?x=73439 (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
3 See generally id.
214 See generally A New CBSA Commercial Vision for 2017,
http://www.dominiongroup.con/uploads/ANewCBSACommercialVision for 2017_Syn
ops(1).pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
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the anticipated trade trends and border challenges can be met and that all
programs do work together synergistically to address our challenges.
We have also had internal government discussions ourselves in Canada on
the concept of a perimeter strategy, and we are working with the United
States to interdict suspect travelers or goods before they arrive. Risk
assessment has shown indeed that many of our risks are from outside the
perimeter.
So between our migration integrity officer and, container security
programs - we will be getting advanced information on who and what are
coming to our country. We are now starting to talk about a board/no-board
process for airline passengers. Right now we actually wait until they get here
even though we get electronic information on them before we decide how to
deal with them. But we want to push that back. So these are different things
that we can talk about in terms of perimeter security as we move further.
So the past several years have shown tremendous change. As I have said,
I have been with the agency 30 years, and we are running hard. I think we
have made great strides in securing the border. We have a much better idea
of who is coming across and what the goods are and where they are coming
from. And to be honest, too much is at stake if we do not get the border right.
Thank you.
MS. MATTHIESEN: Well, I do not know about you guys, but I heard
more about verification and trust and obligations and investments. Starting to
sound like my pre-nup, but thanks for that.
I know you have questions, and I will give the first question to Miss Sue
Ross. And I know to whom it is addressed, but go ahead.
DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE REMARKS OF WARREN COONS,
TODD C. OWEN AND JOY ALDOUS
MS. ROSS: I may actually fool you with this one, Birgit. Todd, I will
address this to you, but I will ask Joy to answer it as well because what we
heard both of you talk about was a lot of stuff that for many of us would fall
in the category of enforcement, at least impediments. And one of the kinds
that we heard earlier today from more than one panelist was there is a
feeling, particularly with C-TPAT, that there are not that many benefits.
So if the two of you could please address from the C-TPAT, Todd, the
question of the benefits and what is being planned, but more generally, sort
of the issue of what are, for example, the top three or four things that your
agencies are doing in the category of pure trade facilitation as distinct from
security?
MR. OWEN: Well, I first off, we hear this often. We hear that FAST
lanes are not fast enough, those types of comments whenever we go out and
speak to the trade.
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So, we commissioned the University of Virginia last year to conduct a
comprehensive analysis of all of our members to say what is in it for you,
what are the benefits that you are receiving for your participation within CTPAT.2 15 We had about a third of our members at that time, about 1,800 of
the 6,000 or so that we had in the program that did respond. And you can see
the full results of our survey on our CBP website.
But by and large from that survey, most of the members were pleased.
They felt that the benefits either equaled or outweighed the cost of the
investment they made to join the program. When you look at it, clearly it
differs across the different types of entities that conjoin C-TPAT.
The benefit that importers receive is reduced inspections. And we have
our data that shows they do receive fewer security inspections, and they do
receive fewer trade compliance inspections than non-C-TPAT members.
What people need to remember when we often hear is I am receiving the
same amount of inspections that I did before I joined the program before
9/11, you have to look at what CBP has done since 9/11. Our rate of exam
has gone up significantly. When you look at the truck traffic today, one of
every four trucks is inspected for different causes and different concerns.
The rail environment is significantly higher. We have 100 percent
scanning imaging equipment of all the rail traffic that comes in from Mexico,
and we are at a very high percentage coming in from Canada as well.21 6
When you look at the Maritime environment, the level of exams has
increased in that role, too.
So if you are only seeing an increase or a slight increase or the same
amount of exams that you saw before 9/11, then you are seeing the benefits
of being a member of C-TPAT because a non-C-TPAT member has seen that
jump. Someone is getting those exams, and if it is not a C-TPAT member and we have the data that is in that University of Virginia study,217 so I would
encourage everyone to take a look at that.
The other service entities, the Customs brokers, the seat carriers, when
they say, well, what is in the program for me, the benefits that they receive
are not directly benefits that they receive from the U.S. government. The
benefit that they receive comes in terms of marketing themselves. Your
largest U.S. importers are all a member of C-TPAT because they want to do
the right thing. They want to help secure their supply chain, they want fewer
215 See generally Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism: Report of Results of
Cost/Benefit Survey 2007, http://www.virginia.edu/surveys/press/2007/ctpat/text.htm (last
visited Oct. 9, 2008).
216 See generally Thomas S. Winkowski, Hearing Before the Senate Homeland Security and
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available

http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/ files/092508Winkowski.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2008).
217 Customs-Trade PartnershipAgainst Terrorism, supra note 215.
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supply chain disruptions, and they will require contractually that their service
providers also join C-TPAT. So if you are a seat carrier, if you are a Customs
broker, the benefit comes in being able to attract that repeat business, those
big companies.
In the land border, the highway carriers, the benefit of C-TPAT is FAST.
You do not receive FAST unless you are in C-TPAT. 1 8 Again the carriers
are driven by the desire to gain that business from, you know, the big three
automakers, that recurring business who again contractually require that their
carriers be a member of C-TPAT in order to receive access to the FAST
lanes.
One thing I think you need to keep in mind - and we have not really
touched on border wait times and all those issues that we are all familiar with
- but the infrastructure at all of our land borders are significantly outdated.21 9
These are very old crossings that have not been updated in many locations
for decades. 220 And you look at a three-lane bridge, like you have the Peace
Bridge in Buffalo, it is only three lanes. You know, you are going to get
backups at peak times.
So I think the infrastructure really contributes to the perception that FAST
is not fast enough. When you look to the trucker actually getting to the
primary booth, there is a time savings that they receive by being C-TPAT,
but they waited in line for an hour which is the same as every other truck
because it is only a two-lane highway to get to the bridge, they are going to
feel as though the program is not working for them. So I think those are some
of the benefits that we do see from the program, and again, we have that
comprehensive University of Virginia survey that is on our website. 221
MS. ROSS: The top three things you are doing for trade facilitation?
MR. OWEN: FAST lanes, the reduced inspections, and again,
deployment of the technology significantly. You look at the large-scale
imaging systems. Before we had that, if we wanted to look at your cargo, it
would go to the warehouse to be stripped out, and you would lose a whole
day. Now with the large-scale imaging systems, we scan your trailer, your
truck, your container in less than a minute. If there are no anomalies, if there
are no concerns, it is on down the road.
So I think the agency has taken a great step to add facilitation as well as
address our security concerns.
See generally Free and Secure Trade (Fast) Highway Carrier Application Process,
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/publications/pub/rc4299-eng.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
2 9 See generally Jesse Goldman & Milos Barutciski, The Challenges of A Thickening U.S.
218

- Canada Border, Metrocorpcounsel, Oct. 2008,
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&EntryNo=8878.
220
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MS. ALDOUS: Very similar answer. I do not think there is a lot more I
can add other than for our FAST participants on the importer side, we also
have a custom self-assessment program which does significantly I believe
reduce their back-end cost, the cost for the entry summary. They can selfassess their own revenue, they manage their own books and records, and they
actually report to us from their commercial books and records rather than
from a Customs inventory control process. And I think there has been some
significant savings there.
MS. MATTHIESEN: There was another - The gentleman there, please.
MR. CRANE: David Crane from Toronto. Just as an opening comment, it
is amazing to think of the amount of resources we have had to divert to
security since 9/11 all over the world, and how this is an ongoing impact the
terrorists themselves must never have dreamed of that the amount of effort
and inconvenience and other things that have resulted from that since 9/11
going forward into the future.
I have a couple of questions. One is I wondered how effective all these
measures really are. I think it is one thing to generate statistics which can
give numbers of inspections, numbers beside the other, but we have seen this
in many instances in the past where in the Vietnam War and in other
conflicts people can give long lists of statistics, but they do not necessarily
reveal the reality of what is being accomplished.
And just to use one example in Canada-U.S., the United States continues
despite all these efforts to be very concerned about the volume of drugs
flowing into the United States from Canada, often express themselves
publicly on this.222 The Canadians are very concerned about the level of
weapons being smuggled into Canada from the United States, and this
continues to be a concern despite all of these new measures that you have
introduced. 2 3 So I wondered what you can really say about the effectiveness
of these things. I think statistics are one thing, but real effectiveness?
Secondly, I wondered how you define high-risk. We are told there are
137,000 hits last year. What did those hits reveal? I mean, what triggers a
hit? Is it just any slightest kind of suspicion of somebody looking the wrong
way? And as a result of these hits, how many actual illegal activities did we
uncover as a result of those? Is it one percent, 10 percent? Do we have any
data on that? And what did they consist of? I mean, counterfeit goods or
drugs or what kinds of things?
And finally, one of the effects of this heightened border security is a lot of
what I would consider to be innocent people now being caught up in this
222

See Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) Canada-United States IBET Threat

Assessment 2007, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/security/ibetsthreatassesse.htm (last visited
Oct. 9, 2008).
223 See id
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traffic. If you are referring to people who did stupid things - maybe when
they were teenagers or something else - now have a criminal record, now
they are getting turned away at the border just for some silly thing they did
many, many years ago, and we now have the data that just increases
significantly the number of people who get stuck at the border for no good
purpose. And I just wondered what you could say about that and how that
interferes with privacy of individuals. And that kind of thing can jack up
statistics quite a bit without being the least bit meaningful.
MS. MATTHIESEN: There were quite a few questions in that, but I
actually welcome those questions. I thought they were very on point. I am
not sure if there is one person in particular you wanted to address your
questions to or MR. CRANE: Anybody who wants to, or maybe nobody wants to.
MS. MATTHIESEN: Okay. I am going to give first shot of that to
Warren.
MR. COONS: Yeah. If you do not mind, just with respect to how
successful we have been - and I agree with you on the first to a degree - and
that is one of the challenges that we have in IBET, that statistics do not
necessarily tell the story. And that is why we believe that the sharing of
intelligence that goes back and forth and within the parameters of each of our
country's laws, too, I might add, but the sharing of intelligence that allows us
to be in the right place at the right time which would not have happened
before.
So for instance, I will give you two examples. First of all, I just read in
my hotel room, I read a press release from DHS that talked about seizure of
narcotics along the border between Quebec and the state of Vermont in
which U.S. Border Patrol saw the two vehicles there, arrested two people,
seized 700 pounds of marijuana. IBET unit was called and immediately
responded on the Canadian side. We arrested three suspects that were in the
camouflage gear and two others subsequent to that and $70,000 cash. It is
merely an anecdote I understand, but what I am saying is that unless those
relationships were actually formed and people had that working relationship,
that cooperative relationship that we have now, I do not believe that we
would have seen those kind of successes previously.
Now that may be a bigger case however, on a weekly basis we get reports
of just one or two people coming across the border illegally. It does not
sound like a big deal, but it is Canada and U.S. surveillance being at the
border collaboratively because we have intelligence that says those people
are going to arrive at that point at that given time. That did not happen
before. It is not something that is going to make the news and, you know,
capture the imagination of people in both countries, but the reality is - and
not to overstate it - but we do not know who those people are until we
actually interdict them, and that is the importance of what we do - I believe -

CANADA-UNITED STATES LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 34, Vol. 1]

between the ports of entry along the border because the people that we are
interdicting are people that are committing criminal acts because they are
going between the ports of entry. So these are people that for whatever
reason have ill intentions.
And as far as the rest of those, I will turn it over.
MR. OWEN: I will speak to the 137,000 statistic that I put out there. That
was the number of high-risk shipments that were inspected as part of our
container security initiative in FY07 overseas. So 137,000 containers were
stopped because there was some trigger that made us concerned enough to
work with our host country to examine it before it got put on the vessel.
The triggers why we cannot talk about them, we have that advanced data,
we know who is involved in the transaction, we have our intelligence
community feeding us that information as well. So those 137,000 containers
that we stop as part of the container security initiative are really the higher
risk for terrorism purposes. We are not looking for trade compliance
overseas. We are not looking for counterfeits, anything like that. There was
something in the manifests, something in our intelligence that drove us to
those 137,000 containers that said, you know, we have enough of a concern
to stop it and look at it before it gets put on a vessel.
And again, this is a significant improvement about where we were about
six years ago where the first time we have that opportunity would be when it
was sitting within our U.S. port of entry. And if there was something terrible
in that container, that is the wrong time to find out about it.
So you know, I think we have done a good job to do that. There is a lot of
unintended positives that come out of a lot of these security programs, too.
When you look at the radiation portal monitors that we now have deployed
all around the country, you would not believe the level of contaminated
metals that are imported into the United States or attempted to be imported,
everything from contaminated belt buckles to manhole covers, shipments
coming out of the far east, you know, some of the lesser developed countries
that will melt down, you know, different materials that are contaminated.
Prior to this ring of RPMs around the country, all of that would just come
in, and the U.S. consumer would be buying these contaminated products
unbeknown to them. So on a regular basis, we interdict and stop, and either
seize or reject this contaminated material. So there are other benefits that
come from the stronger security than we envisioned when we deployed that
technology.
MS. MATTHIESEN: I am going to give one of the last questions to this
gentleman here who has had his hand up for a bit.
MR. CONROY: Hugh Conroy with the Whatcom Council of
Governments in Washington state. I wanted to get back to Joy's mention of
an expected mutual recognition for the Partner in Protection program, PIP. At
the Blaine border crossing of Pacific Highway in Washington, Washington
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state recently completed a northbound FAST lane, so now we have FAST
lanes in both directions.224 But as we have looked to build the user base for
that new lane, we have been reacquainted with the fact that beyond the driver
FAST card, the FAST program is the assemblage of each country's various
program for the carriers and the shippers.
So I was wondering does this mutual recognition of PIP - my
understanding is that is the shipper side - but do you expect these types of
mutual recognitions to give one country's FAST enrollees better access to the
FAST lane in both directions or vice-versa, I mean, to sort of push together
these various components under the umbrella of FAST in one bi-nationally
administered way?
MS. ALDOUS: I am not actually sure I understand your question. Today
you can with - to be in FAST you have to be PIP in Canada, you have to be
C-TPAT in U.S. There are some additional requirements for Canadian
importers. 225
So the mutual recognition is simply a first step in saying that our PIP
program will now be compatible with the minimum standards of the U.S.
including the site validations. And it is the first step. Ideally one application
someday.
MR. CONROY: So a PIP enrollee would not necessarily get access to the
FAST lane southbound as a result of this mutual recognition? They would
have to separately still enroll in the C-TPAT, and the same with the carriers
in the CSA and C-TPAT program?
MS. ALDOUS: Correct.
MR. OWEN: Right. At this point as the first step, they would still be
needed to enroll in both programs. But a benefit that will come is once we
have a mutual recognition is that U.S. CBP will be able to accept the findings
of the onsite validation or review what is performed by CBSA.
We have our first mutual recognition agreement with New Zealand in
place for about a year now, and the way this works on the operational side is
that the New Zealand exporter supply for what is called the New Zealand
Secure Export scheme. New Zealand Customs goes out and verifies that it
has adopted the stronger measures, and they start affording them export
benefits on their end.
Prior to the mutual recognition agreement, U.S. officers would travel to
New Zealand, conduct very much a redundant inspection, if you will, and
224
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come to the same conclusion. So now that we have two comparable
programs, we can accept the findings from New Zealand Customs, and we no
longer need to go out to New Zealand to form these validations.
And on the U.S. program, you have three tiers of benefits for the
importers. The more significant trade facilitation benefits in terms of reduce
inspections come after you have had this onsite validation. So now you are
already a member of New Zealand, you are quickly already receiving Tier 2
or Tier 3 status in the United States.
We envision the same type of operation with Canadian Partners in
Protection. I mentioned before that a third of the CBP members are Canadian
non-resident importers or highway carriers. When you look at the numbers
for Canada's PIP program, very, very comparable. We have a lot of the same
companies enrolled in both programs. And while now they still need to enroll
in the two programs, they are no longer going to have to go through a
redundant review by a CBP team and then by a CBSA team. So there will be
some benefits from there.
And again, this is just an initial first step. Ideally we would like to get to a
program where you have one comparable application process, if both is
vetted against the same types of law enforcement databases. We have
agreement on the types of prior bad acts, if you will, that should not allow
you to be considered a low-risk trader. So this is a first step. This is a
significant first step, but there is more work to be done in here.
MS. MATTHIESEN: We have time for one last question, and I am going
to give it to Kim.
MS. O'NEAL: I think we are missing the 800-pound gorilla in the room.
A lot of this border protection, increased security, it has all happened because
of terrorists. I have not heard anything about how many bad guys we are
getting at the border. Is this really increasing our security in that way?
Obviously with organized crime, we have got two-way traffic that we have
always been working against that. What improvements have we done and
achieved on the terrorist side?
MR. COONS: With respect to the IBET program and national security, it
is important to understand that since 9/11, the way that the RCMP broke up
their programs and got into the national security area was to implement
Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs). So these are the
teams that are the equivalent of the FBI in the United States who are
primarily responsible for the investigation of national security.
Our priority is national security because we are on the border, and we
may be the first responders to national security. When we interdict people,
one of the first things that we do is obviously run various checks through a
number of databases, secure databases, to try to determine whether or not
individuals have some kind of nexus to national security.
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But the national security, as soon as we get some kind of hit or some kind
of indication that this is something worthy of a national security
investigation, those files are immediately transferred to our national security
enforcement teams, and IBET teams do not participate in that investigation
unless they are asked to do so by our national security people. So we are just
the pointy end of the stick, if you will, first responders for national security,
but we will refer all of our national security issues to our national security
sections.
In terms of specific numbers, to be quite frank with you, the referrals that
we make to national security I would not be prepared to discuss in this room
anyway because I am not satisfied that the data is 100 percent accurate. But it
is not a great number. I can tell you that much.
MS. ONEAL: But is it working?
MR. COONS: Well, is it working? That is a very difficult question to
answer because ultimately, some people argue, well, it is working because
we have not had another incident since 9/11, and that we have had
investigations where we have actually been successful in preventing attacks
in Canada and the United States during the planning process. 226
So is it working from that perspective? We could make the argument that
it is. But I would be a fool to sit here before you and tell you that we are safe
against a terrorist attack because there could be something that is being
planned for tomorrow. Hopefully we know about it, but we do not
necessarily.
MS. MATTHIESEN: Thank you very much. Thanks to our panelists, and
thank you for the questions.
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